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I. INTRODUCCIÓN  
After the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers and the subsequent foreign 
policy actions of the George W. Bush administration, a renewed interest 
emerged in the phenomenon of anti-Americanism. While relatively recent 
foreign policy actions of the United States have stirred up anti-American 
sentiments in different parts of the globe, the phenomenon itself has a 
history with roots dating back to at least to the 19th century. The greater 
part of the literature on anti-Americanism focuses on conceptualizing and 
defining the phenomenon and measuring its presence in different countries. 
It is argued now that in recent years anti-Americanism has become so 
common and widely shared that it “has begun to mutate from the world of 
having been almost exclusively a ‘dependent’ variable to becoming an 
‘independent’ one as well” (Markovits 2007:8). However, if the 
consequences of anti-Americanism are currently addressed in scientific 
research, this mainly concerns consequences for the US national interest 
(Datta 2009; Katzenstein and Keophane 2007). Systematic research into the 
effects of anti-Americanism on politics and policies in the states where 
anti-Americanism is present is relatively scarce, with the exception of 
Meunier (2005 and 2007).  
This article aims to contribute to the debate by conducting a 
comparative case study into the effects of anti-Americanism. The cases 
selected are Brazilian decision-making on the negotiation of the FTAA 
(2001-2005) and French decision-making during the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT (1982-1993). Important commonalities are that Brazil and France 
are medium sized powers that see themselves as great powers. Both strive 
for influence within their respective regions and are anxious about US 
interference in this respect. Existing publications agree that anti-
Americanism is present both in Brazil and in France. Our cases have 
positive scores on the independent variable (presence of anti-
Americanism), and in both this score is partially related to concerns for US 
dominance in their respective regions. Empirical analysis is expected to 
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show differences and similarities in the effects of anti-Americanism in 
Brazil and in France, likely to result in theoretical implications more 
widely applicable than would be possible on the basis of empirical research 
within a single region.  
The policies studied are economic in nature. Trade policies in 
particular are usually analysed from theoretical perspectives emphasising 
economic and to some extent political interests. Analysing the effects of 
anti-Americanism, which can be considered an ideational variable rather 
than a material one, is therefore likely to provide new insights. 
Furthermore, because economic policy may be considered a relatively hard 
(or less likely) case for the influence of ideational or non-material 
variables,1 potential findings confirming the influence of anti-Americanism 
in the cases selected would indicate a greater degree of likeliness that 
similar effects of anti-Americanism may be found in other issue areas as 
well.  
In order to answer the question to what extent and how anti-
Americanism influenced Brazilian and French decision-making and 
policies, we will first shed light on the concept of anti-Americanism as it is 
applied in this article and compare and contrast it in the two states. In the 
subsequent case analysis we investigate whether and how anti-
Americanism affected Brazilian and French policy-making processes and 
foreign trade policies. The final section will summarily discuss the 
outcomes and pose questions for further research.  
 
II. CONCEPTUALISING ANTI-AMERICANISM 
The conceptualisation and definition of anti-Americanism is an issue 
of debate. Meunier (2010) places the positions in this debate on a 
continuum between anti-Americanism as “a fundamental prejudice against 
the essence of the United States […] a pervasive distrust of what the United 
States is” on the one side and, “a critique of specific US policy actions […] 
a negative opinion against what the United States does” on the other side. 
In the former, the attitude of distrust is based on the difference in values 
held by the US and those held by the actor with the anti-American attitude. 
In the latter, the anti-American attitude is based on criticism of US policies.  
The view adopted in this article is that although anti-Americanism 
may increase due to specific US foreign policies, criticism of US policies 
should in itself not be regarded as anti-Americanism. Only when these 
policies are criticised as being typically ‘American’ (United States) in that 
they are for example oppressive or ultra-capitalist – ultimately pointing at 
criticism of what the US is perceived to be – should these forms of 
criticism be regarded as anti-American. We consider anti-Americanism as 
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an unfavourable predisposition towards the US that translates in negative 
beliefs about and attitudes towards the US and may even result in negative 
stereotyping or ascription of inferiority to the US (Markovits 2007; 
O’Connor 2009).  
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the causes 
and presence of anti-Americanism in different states at various points in 
time (Chiozza 2009; Markovits 2007). Only recently scholars have begun 
to investigate the political consequences of anti-Americanism. Katzenstein 
and Keohane (2007) as well as Datta (2009) studied whether worldwide 
anti-Americanism affected US national interest and power. While the 
former found no significant relation between anti-Americanism and a 
decline in US soft power, the latter argues that anti-Americanism does 
precipitate a decline in US soft power and economic interests. Based on a 
quantitative analysis of French, German and British preferences on security 
policy, Ray and Johnston (2007) consider that the degree of anti-
Americanism present in these states significantly affects their support for 
security policy through NATO (the ‘American’ solution) as against support 
for a more European or national security policy.  
The idea that anti-Americanism may lead to decreased alignment 
with the US and to resist following the ‘American’ course is widely shared 
in the literature. Quinn and Cox (2008) as well as D’Appollonia (2008) 
provide empirical examples of this claim, but what is still lacking in the 
literature is in depth qualitative assessments of the effects of anti-
Americanism on such policies and theoretical reflection on how and when 
anti-Americanism is likely to have effects. The case studies presented here 
are appropriate for uncovering the causal processes at play and reflecting 
on theoretical implications for future research. 
 
III. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN BRAZIL 
The roots of Brazilian anti-Americanism date back to the 18th and 
19th centuries. The elites of the South American independent nations hated 
the US citizens’ tendency to “place Latin Americans below them in any 
racial hierarchy” (Cochrane 1993). Apart from the feelings of superiority 
attributed to US citizens, the anti-Catholic and protestant colonial roots of 
the US created mistrust of its government and society in Latin America. As 
a consequence, Latin American anti-Americanism was “fraught with 
misunderstanding and distrust” due to cultural misperceptions by the US 
(Cochrane 1993), Catholic Church mistrust of American Protestantism and 
Latin American elitist intellectuals’ bent on showing the US as culturally 
inferior (Castro 2000). These actors put forward the perception of US as 
uncultured, materialist, utilitarian, lacking any artistic qualities, and its 
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policies were portrayed as ‘the output of a flawed civilization’ (McPherson 
2007:82-84). 
The asymmetry in power in the advantage of the United States 
inevitably created strains and conflicts of interests, which sometimes ended 
with military defeat and military occupation of Latin American nations 
(Cochrane 1993). As early as the 19th century, fear of US imperialism 
started to take root, due to the US ideology of ‘manifest destiny’ 
(McPherson 2007:90). This anti-imperialist strand of anti-Americanism 
remained a constant factor in Latin America and would play a role in 
Brazilian anti-Americanism after the end of the Cold War. 
Whereas Brazil had aimed to play an important international role 
after World War II (during which it had supported the Allies), the US was 
less interested in Latin America after the war and not keen on contributing 
the Brazil’s international status (Bowman 2006:151). During the Cold War, 
anti-Communism and Brazilian dependence on the US, on the one hand, 
tempered the potential for anti-Americanism in Brazil (Bowman 2006:149), 
but the upsurge of socialist parties, on the other hand, increased Brazilian 
criticism of US-led capitalism and US imperialism (McPherson 2007:85). 
Anti-Americanism was taken up by leftist politicians, academics and trade 
unions that not only protested against the US intervention in Vietnam but 
also denounced US support of military rule (1964-1984) in Brazil 
(Bowman 2006:153). In this sense, anti-Americanism in Latin America 
seems to follow the same path Markovits found in Europe: it moved from 
being a phenomenon of the right until the 1920s, to become one of the left 
since the 1960s (Markovitz 2007).  
After the end of the Cold War, anti-Americanism re-emerged in 
Brazil aided by two factors. The first was Brazil’s quest for regional 
influence in South America and its demand to be respected as a large and 
important country (Bowman 2006:142). The Brazilian perception of itself 
as a regional power emphasises self-assertion in the South American region 
and the wish of recognition (Tollefson 2002), together with emulation of 
the US. Indicative of the latter is the Brazilian demand of equal treatment 
from the American government. The second factor that increased anti-
Americanism in Brazil was US foreign policies (e.g. the interventions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan) which were described as ‘the arrogant, unilateral and 
militaristic policies of Washington’ (McPherson 2007:100). The US was 
perceived as a dangerous imperialist power, posing a threat to Brazilian 
regional power, and Brazilian governments looked for ways to minimize 
Washington’s regional influence (McPherson 2007:51). 
While anti-Americanism is clearly present in Brazil, anti-American 
sentiments are not shared among all the citizens and the political actors in 
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Brazil (Bowman 2006:158). It also appears prone to wax and wane with 
political changes in Brazil itself and to some extent with US foreign 
policies as well (McPherson 2007:54). When there is harmony between the 
US and Brazilian governments’ interests, pro-US sentiments increase, and 
when there is disharmony, anti-Americanism increases (Bowman 2006). 
US policies and demands therefore increase anti-Americanism only to the 
extent that these policies are detrimental to the Brazilian self-perception as 
a regional power.  
 
IV. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE 
The earliest foundations of French anti-Americanism date back to the 
19th century “when a set of stereotypes emerged that have been recycled 
and developed upon ever since” (O’Connor 2009:1). French anti-
Americanism was characterised by aesthetic, political and cultural strands. 
After the discovery of the American continent, French anti-Americanism 
first took the form of commiseration, then turned into disdain, to make 
place for astonishment, worry and anger between 1880 and 1900 (Roger 
2007:274).  
Commiseration can be found in the ‘naturalist’ critique of the New 
World, describing the dismal nature of its flora and fauna and 
hypothesising the contamination of people, animals and plants once they 
had reached the New World. The disdain in the early 19th century – 
sometimes labeled aesthetic anti-Americanism and considered an important 
precursor to its cultural strand – was related to the perceived poor aesthetic 
output in literature and philosophy and to the uncultivated American social 
mores (Roger 2007:36). The traits ascribed to America and to Americans 
were often contrasted with the French self-image: France’s superior 
intellectual and spiritual values with American non-civilisation and the 
American ‘way of life’ with France’s mores. By the end of the 19th century 
the French were astonished by the growth of US economic and political 
power, and the image of the ‘ridiculous yankee’ was replaced by the 
‘terrifying yankee’ (Roger 2007:142). The US was still considered inferior 
and its capitalist trust-system, industrialisation and consumerism were 
vehemently denounced (Nettelbeck 2007; Wall 2007) but a perception 
started to take shape that the US was aiming at world dominance (Roger 
2007). 
This perception of a US imperialist drive for world dominance 
obtained a particularly firm footing in France after the two World Wars, 
when steep French decline could no longer be ignored. French anti-
Americanism now took a more defensive turn, aimed at defending France 
against US political, economic and cultural hegemony (Nettelbeck 2007). 
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The US was not considered a benign hegemon, but instead a force aiming 
at subjecting other states not only politically, but also economically and 
culturally (Judt 1992). Americanisation was considered cultural 
imperialism and a threat ‘destroy[ing] the individuality of the world’s many 
cultures and to impose a homogenised and spiritually vacuous 
Americanism over them all’ (O’Connor 2009:9). 
French governments considered that France should reinstate its 
grandeur and great power status as ‘la Grande nation’ (Cogan 2003:12-14). 
President Charles de Gaulle argued that US hegemony should be resisted in 
Europe, and France should lead Europe in serving as a counterweight 
against the US (Wall 2007). Important in this self-image of France is that it 
does not only consider itself a leader in Europe, but that its role is to lead 
against US dominance. Thus, in redefining its identity after its decline in 
power, France “used America as an instrument of self-definition” and 
defined itself against America (Nettelbeck 2007:153). Anti-American 
prejudices depicting the US as a domineering ally and a non-benign 
hegemon that should be resisted became embedded in French state identity 
and have remained important in France ever since (Wall 2007), so anti-
American sentiments are shared widely among both citizens and political 
actors (Meunier 2007). 
While anti-Americanism is clearly present both in Brazil and in 
France, it is a more constant and widespread factor in France, where it is 
less prone to wax and wane with domestic political changes. What France 
and Brazil have in common is that both are particularly anxious about US 
influence in their respective regions. For Brazil its self-perception of being 
a regional power does not in itself include anti-American elements and US 
policies and demands increase anti-Americanism only to the extent that 
these policies are detrimental to the Brazilian self-perception. For France, 
combating US hegemony is a goal in itself as France explicitly defines 
itself as a counterweight against the US2.  
 
V. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION ON THE FTAA 
In December 1994, the US proposed a FTAA among the nations of 
the Western Hemisphere but negotiations did not begin until 2001, after the 
American Executive obtained fast track authority (Gistelinck 2005:16-17). 
From the beginning, Brazil made clear that it wanted to include discussions 
on trade in agriculture and that the negotiations would be conducted in 
concert with the rest of Mercosur (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay). 
Regarding the influence of anti-Americanism on Brazilian participation in 
FTAA negotiation, two stages can be identified: one before and one after 
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2003, when the leftist PT (Workers Party) and its leader Lula (Luiz Inacio 
da Silva) won the presidential election.  
 
2001-2003: Economic considerations during the Cardoso government 
Under the government of the social democrat Fernando H. Cardoso, 
foreign policy was linked to the perception of the stagnation and decrease 
of Brazilian trade possibilities with developed nations, unless concessions 
in agriculture were made in the WTO (World Trade Organization) or the 
FTAA (Lima 2005:20). During an FTAA Summit in Quebec (2001), 
Cardoso said the agreement would be welcome if it established shared rules 
on antidumping and ended non tariff barriers to trade (Bandeira 2005:5). 
Without those measures, it would be irrelevant for Brazil.  
The Brazilian government identified the FTAA threats in a Ministry 
of Development document – 1) an increase in imports from NAFTA/North 
American Free Trade Agreement (United States, Canada, Mexico) nations; 
2) a decrease in Brazilian exports to the rest of Latin America; 3) the 
possibility that members of the FTAA would extend preferences to third 
parties; and 4) that multinational companies operating in Brazil would 
reshape their regional strategies. Brazil sharpened this position after 2000, 
when Chile, instead of joining Mercosur signed a bilateral trade treaty with 
the US, and the Argentine government appeared ready to do the same. 
Thus, the threat extended to Mercosur because the FTAA could mean the 
end of this sub-regional integration scheme. Parallel negotiations of a trade 
agreement between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur were not 
considered a threat, since the EU supported the institutionalisation of 
Mercosur and did not compete with Brazil for influence in South America 
(Gistelinck 2005:20).  
The difficulties in the negotiations sprang from the size of the 
Brazilian economy, which the government considered its comparative 
advantage since its share of trade with the U S was relatively minor in 
comparison to other Latin American economies (Abreu, 2006: 3). 
Additionally, relevant products from the viewpoint of protectionist interests 
in Brazil were relevant for American export interests (computers, 
electronics and telecoms equipment, transport equipment), and export 
interests of Brazil (oranges, sugar, footwear, heavy trucks, steel, tobacco, 
etc.) were sensitive imports from the American viewpoint (Abreu 2006:41, 
45). Results of a gravitational model applied by Sangmeister and Taalouch 
(2002) support the skeptical position of Brazil vis-a-vis the FTAA. They 
quote from a study of the Brazilian Planning Ministry that established that 
an agreement with the EU would have a similar negative impact and that 
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the growth of Brazilian exports to the EU would be less than in the FTAA. 
Nevertheless, this did not prove to be an obstacle for economic cooperation 
with the EU. 
At first, Brazilian economic interests were not united. For example, 
among industrialists, sector interests generated divisions – shoes, textiles 
and orange juice producers favored a faster negotiation of tariff barriers in 
the FTAA; chemical, electronics and capital goods producers looked for 
special concessions in the FTAA; while steel, furniture, and paper sectors 
opposed it (Botelho 2003:186-187). Those in opposition employed 
arguments as their inability to compete with American goods or the fact 
that imports to the US were not harmed by tariffs but by antidumping 
measures and subsidies (Epsteyn 2009:19, 27), and all of them appeared 
interested in institutionalising their participation in the FTAA consultation 
process (Santana 2000:174).  
During this stage of the negotiation, neither the government nor the 
private sector employed anti-American discourse, but anti-Americanism 
appeared in the discourse of the main opposition party (Lula´s PT), trade 
unions and NGOs. Examples of anti-American trade unions views can be 
found in Correio Sindical Mercosur and Correio Sindical Latinoamerica, 
organs of the Coordenadora de Centrais Sindicais do Cone Sul, together 
with anti-FTAA articles and points of view of the Hemispheric Social 
Alliance and the Continental Mobilization against the FTAA, which also 
included NGOs. The PT was a member of the anti-American Social World 
Forum of Porto Alegre, a group of social movements, NGOs, and trade 
unions, supported by European political parties that rejected the FTAA as a 
project of economic and political annexation of Brazil to the US 
(Marulanda 2008:24). 
Before 2003 the government saw the FTAA as an economic threat to 
Brazil, and the only ideational element present in the justification of an 
anti-FTAA position was the notion that Brazil is predestined to play an 
important role in the world, and in order to reach this, it must develop an 
autonomous industrial base. Opting for Mercosur as the organisation 
through which the FTAA should be negotiated strengthened Brazil’s 
position on the FTAA and it was clearly linked to its self-perception as the 
potential leader of South America. At the same time, its failure to add Chile 
to Mercosur contributed to the feeling that the US was threatening its 
regional leadership.  
Even after the Summit Meeting in Quebec (2001), when Brazil 
changed from a “defensive position” to one of “conflicting participation” in 
the FTAA negotiation (Botelho 2003:172) anti-Americanism was not part 
of the official discourse. But the FTAA had become a highly politicised 
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issue in Brazil. That year, the Brazilian government issued an open 
invitation to organizations interested in the FTAA to send 
recommendations and suggestions, finding response from business 
organisations, trade union federations, and academic and consumer groups 
(Botelho 2003:176, 178, 181). At the same time, the government, 
industrialists, and agri-business agreed on an almost unanimous anti-FTAA 
position during the discussion of the Farm Act and the Trade Promotion 
Authority (Santana 2007:31-32), approved in 2002 by the US Congress. 
This act extended large subsidies to American producers of corn and soy, 
and imposed many conditions for negotiating tariff cuts in orange juice, 
tobacco, dairy products, and other goods of interest to Brazilian exporters 
(Markwald 2005:109).  
The Brazilian anti-FTAA position under Cardoso was predominantly 
instigated by economic considerations. While Brazil also feared adverse 
effects on its regional aspirations in Latin America, these fears did not give 
rise to anti-American discourse on the part of the government. It did not 
heed the advice of PT, trade unions and NGO’s that branded the FTAA as 
an American ploy to gain power in the region. Judging from the policy 
process described and the governmental discourse legitimatising its 
position, we may conclude that anti-Americanism did not affect the 
position taken by the Brazilian government on the FTAA before 2003 nor 
did it affect the policy-making process substantially. 
 
Lula takes office: The empowerment of anti-american groups 
While Lula had previously supported his anti-FTAA stance with 
anti-American rhetoric, he toned down his discourse during the presidential 
election campaign in 2002. He still supported the idea that Brazil should 
withdraw from the negotiation and submit to plebiscite whether Brazilians 
wanted the hemispheric treaty (Almeida 2003; Marulanda 2008), but 
during the election campaign and after his election, he had to make 
concessions to his moderate nationalist allies, leading to a watering down 
of his anti-American speech (Carvalho and Ferrari Filho 2004). The PT’s 
election victory is considered the result of ‘widespread displeasure with 
neoliberal economic policies’ rather than an effect of Brazilian anti-
Americanism (McPherson 2007:51). While in 2001, the PT got the 
Chamber of Deputies to approve a motion calling for Brazil to withdraw 
from the FTAA negotiation, less than a year later the party ignored a 
similar trade union’s call for a plebiscite to decide if Brazil should continue 
negotiating (Almeida 2003:90-92, 94).   
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When the PT entered office, the new administration made important 
changes in the bureaucracy in charge of Brazilian foreign economic 
negotiations. As a result, the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, 
Development, and Industry and Commerce lost their central role in favor of 
the Ministry of External Relations. Thus, political departments closer to the 
Executive displaced technically oriented departments. Additionally, 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, a diplomat fired by Cardoso due to his anti-
FTAA comments, was appointed General Secretary of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. He claimed that the restrictions the FTAA imposed on trade, 
investments, government procurement, and intellectual property affected 
Brazilian sovereignty by reducing the state’s internal and external ability 
for collective action. According to him, it was imperative to resist the will 
to insert Brazil into the world by means of economic schemes subordinated 
to external objectives, because this would reduce Brazil to a position 
similar to Puerto Rico (Guimaraes 2001:25-29).  
If the private sector had been the privileged interlocutor of the 
Brazilian government under the Cardoso administration, after 2003 trade 
unions and NGOs gained the upper hand (Botelho 2003:173). In general, 
these domestic actors supported the anti-FTAA policy of the government 
before and after 2003, albeit for different reasons (Epsteyn 2009:2-3).  
The PT government demanded NGOs and trade unions participation, 
as observers and by explicit invitation, in an effort to slow down the FTAA 
negotiations and gain time to align the rest of Mercosur behind its position 
(Botelho 2003:176). In this vein, NGOs and trade unions opposition to the 
FTAA was used to obtain internal legitimacy and external negotiating 
power (Botelho 2003:172). This instrumental use of NGOs and trade 
unions by the PT had the political advantage that the government could 
employ their arguments to legitimate FTAA resistance, making it look as 
something different from the previous radical opposition of the PT, in order 
not to antagonize its coalition partners. The latter did not object when 
Guimaraes and Lula´s diplomatic advisor, Marco Aurelio García, echoed 
the ideationally charged, implicit anti-American, anti-FTAA arguments of 
trade unions and NGOs (Almeida 2008:116), because they also opposed the 
FTAA due to economic reasons.  
Anti-American positions were also exposed by academics influenced 
by the dependency school, which, during the 1960s and 1970s, had 
developed the thesis that Brazil should help reshape world power. For 
example, Costa (2005) stated that, with the FTAA, the US pretended that 
Latin American governments support American international interests, that 
these countries accept its culture, that its universities produce professional 
elites in favor of the US presence in the region, that the economic system 
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allow for the free circulation of goods and capital, but not workers, enlarge 
the production capacity of American business, guarantee American access 
to the region’s raw materials, and inhibit the installation of alternative poles 
of technological development. In this case, the Brazilian government also 
chose to listen to academics whose arguments matched its opposition to the 
FTAA, and to disregard the arguments of those supporting the hemispheric 
agreement (Almeida 2006). 
Nationalist military entered the debate against the FTAA because 
they considered that the US was trying to curb the development of 
advanced military technologies in Latin America, and limit its armed forces 
to maintaining internal order, while drug trafficking and environmental 
threats required direct American intervention (Ferolla 1994:16). Nationalist 
Brazilian officers believed that the Cold War had been supplanted by a 
North-South conflict, so the real enemy of Brazil was the US (Carvalho 
2004). When Brazil became more active in regional and world politics, 
clashes with the US in security issues augmented, for example, on how to 
deal with the Colombian conflict. This conflict threatened the Amazonia, a 
strategic concern for the military, in which ‘in the future the country´s 
natural resources may need to be protected from external ambitions’ 
(National Defense Policy 2005, cited in Lima & Hirst 2006:36). Brazilian 
military also played a relevant role in the state led industrial program, and 
they felt the FTAA threatened to end the protection of military 
technological development in Brazil (Revanales 2002).  
According to a member of the Supreme Military Court and president 
of the Administrative Council of state company Embraer (Ferolla, cited in 
Salvador 2003), the FTAA showed “intolerable levels of American 
hegemonic intentions in the Americas”. He questioned the US policy of 
signing agreements that asked for asymmetric capability reductions in 
strategic areas, employed expressions such as “coercive implementation of 
a pretended free trade area” and “imperial expansion”, and he was quoted 
comparing President Bush to “an American Caligula of the nuclear era”.  
These anti-American discourses contrasted with the diplomatic 
language of President Lula and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who 
emphasised the need to reconcile trade promotion with the preservation of 
socio-environmental, technical, and industrial Brazilian policies as the 
main reason for their opposition to the FTAA (Amorim 2003; “El canciller 
Amorim critica el ALCA”, 2003). Lula himself claimed that he was not 
opposing the FTAA for ideological reasons but because it was a pragmatic 
decision to promote Brazilian interests in the region (Marulanda 2008). 
Thus, ‘securitisation’3 of the FTAA was carried out by other members of 
the administration and the PT, as well as by sympathetic academics, who 
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presented it as ‘existentially threatening´ to Brazil’s sovereignty, economy 
and culture. In this process, they employed anti-American discourse and 
adopted the arguments of trade unions, NGOs and transnational anti-FTAA 
networks. In spite of the visibility of trade unions and NGOs in the 
Brazilian debate, they continued to depend on the willingness of the 
government to heed their opinions, so Epsteyn (2009:29) and Botelho 
(2003:182) consider that they were used by the government to reach its 
own goals. 
Veiga claims that the Brazilian position on the FTAA was based on 
material considerations (economics interest groups), a critique of the US 
from a core-periphery perspective (academics) and a realist nationalist 
vision (military) (Veiga 2002:72). All these justified Brazilian regional 
leadership and the quest for an autonomous global position, with the result 
that they favoured alternative strategies to the FTAA. But, after 2003, 
NGOs and trade unions offered the PT government the alternative of using 
anti-Americanism disguised as specific social demands and not radical 
ideological party positions. Though only a part of the many domestic actors 
opposing the FTAA can be said to be clearly anti-American, the 
government chose to listen to them in order to fulfill its trade negotiating 
goals – delay or reject the FTAA.  
Our analysis shows that the importance of anti-Americanism in the 
domestic policy-making process did increase after the electoral victory of 
the PT in 2003. Its ‘natural’ domestic allies (trade unions and other 
NGO’s), that had applied anti-American arguments against the FTAA from 
the start, were empowered in the domestic-decision making process. They 
provided the government with the means to slow down and reject the 
FTAA, with the support of other domestic actors who opposed the 
negotiation based on more material considerations. 
 
VI. THE FRENCH POSITION IN THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND 
The first step towards a new round of GATT negotiations was the 
proposal made by 18 GATT contracting parties – among which the United 
States – to convene a ministerial meeting in 1982 (Paemen & Bensch 
1995:31). The US was struggling with an increasing trade deficit, which it 
blamed in part on the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and 
was eager to bring agricultural trade measures, particularly export 
subsidies, under effective GATT discipline (Davis 2003:272). The EC 
(European Community) member states were not yet keen on starting 
another round of GATT negotiations (Paemen and Bensch 1995:32). 
Within the EC, France took the most reserved position from the start. It 
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repeatedly stalled the negotiations, giving primacy to its agricultural 
interest over its wider economic interests. 
 
Launching a new GATT round 
A new round of GATT negotiations could be considered in France’s 
economic interest, because it would counter protectionist tendencies of the 
EC’s trading partners (particularly the US) in a period of economic 
slowdown (Paemen and Bensch 1995:32), and because France had 
competitive interests in services that were also to be included in the new 
GATT round. Including agriculture in the negotiations, however, would 
harm French agricultural interests because this sector was unable to 
compete in the world agricultural market without the CAP export 
restitutions4 that would be up for negotiations in GATT (Delorme 1994:41). 
Concerns over the agricultural sector and unwillingness to be forced by the 
US into a new GATT round of American design dominated French 
discourse, supporting the rejection of the negotiation.  
The French government was concerned about France´s agricultural 
export potential if export restitutions should be curtailed. Apart from 
opposing new negotiations because they were simply not in the French 
agricultural interest, France also repeatedly suspected US initiatives and 
tried to convince its European partners that if negotiations were to be held, 
Europe should take the lead and not simply accept an American agenda, 
that emphasised export subsidies and was bound to be in favour of the US. 
France instead proposed a number of negotiating issues to obtain a better 
balance between the various areas of discussion (Report of the article 113 
meeting of 29 June 1982). In line with these arguments, during the 1982 
ministerial conference, French representatives indicated that the American 
Congress was not the center of the universe (New York Times, 29.11.1982). 
After the failure of the conference, socialist President François Mitterrand 
rejoiced in the European solidarity that had created a “front of trade 
resistance against the domination of those more powerful than us” 
(Conférence de presse de M. François Mitterrand, 29 Nov. 1982).  
As time went on, France came under increasing pressure, both from 
the US and its EC partners, to make concessions, but the French farm lobby 
sought to support the government’s resolve by mirroring the earlier 
governmental discourse presenting the US as the antagonist. The FNSEA 
(Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles) warned that 
the US – by its emphasis on restricting export subsidies – was launching an 
offensive against the CAP, while it refused to put its own system of 
agricultural support up for discussion (L’Information Agricole, December 
1985).5 Government officials, such as Henri Nallet, Minister of 
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Agriculture, also repeated the argument that the GATT proposal was 
unacceptable because it would imply having the US impose a negotiating 
agenda on the EC and France (Discours de monsieur Henri Nallet. 20 June 
1985). This argument was particularly applied in domestic discourse, while 
at the European level, France referred to its interests in economic terms, 
denouncing the restriction of export subsidies as long as other instruments 
of agricultural policy (e.g. US deficiency payments) would be left 
unaffected.  
Material arguments would have been sufficient to justify the French 
government’s rejection of GATT negotiations, but the anti-American 
discourse was useful to legitimate its position domestically. Claims by 
Quinn and Cox (2008) as well as D’Appollonia (2008) that anti-
Americanism results in opposition to proposals that are considered 
‘American’ solutions seem to hold here, but it is difficult to prove the 
independent effect of anti-American considerations as French agricultural 
economic interests would have resulted in a similar French position. The 
conclusion is that anti-Americanism strengthened the arguments of French 
economic interests and offered additional legitimisation for the French 
position. 
 
1990: Farm lobby anti-americanism to no avail 
In 1986, the GATT partners launched the GATT Uruguay Round in 
Punta del Este. Even France was finally willing to accept the inclusion of 
agriculture in the negotiations after it had been agreed that all measures 
affecting agricultural trade – not only export subsidies – would be 
discussed (Agra Europe, 26.9.1986). During the first half of the Uruguay 
Round agricultural negotiations mainly focused on the form and modalities 
of an agreement and it was not until 1990 that actual reduction percentages 
of customs duties, internal support and export assistance (subsidies) were 
negotiated. Proposals on these issues were due by October 1990 and would 
be the basis for the Heysel conference in December 1990, during which the 
Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to be completed. 
In the run up to this conference, the EC put a proposal before the 
Council of Ministers to reduce agricultural support by 30 per cent. French 
farm organisations fiercely denounced it, both because it would negatively 
affect the French trade balance, and because it would represent a form of 
capitulation to the US. They argued that acceptance would equal ‘kneeling 
before the power of the United States’, and insisted that European 
agricultural policy should not be defined by states other than the EC 
member states themselves (Le Monde, 25.10.1990; Année politique, 
économique et sociale 1990:389; FNSEA, Communiqué de Presse, 9 Oct. 
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1990). It was even argued that the Commission proposal would turn over 
the internal market to US hegemony (MODEF, Communiqué. Coup de 
grâce! 4 Oct. 1990). When the French government finally accepted a 
watered-down version of the proposal in November 1990, the farm lobby 
considered that the government had sacrificed its agricultural sector on the 
altar of American interests and the EC was regarded as behaving like the 
51st state of the US (Agence France Presse, 6.11.1990; GATT: réactions du 
MODEF, du RPR et de l’Union pour la France, 7 Nov. 1990). 
The French government felt obliged to react to such allegations lest it 
be pictured as a weak government that did not safeguard France’s interests 
in the world. Prime Minister Michel Rocard criticised those who qualified 
the European accord as a ‘capitulation’. He argued that the accord 
safeguarded CAP principles, which had consistently been the French 
demand from the start of the negotiations. Louis Mermaz, who had 
succeeded Nallet as Minister of Agriculture, insisted that French market 
shares were safe. He added that no unilateral concessions had been made to 
the US but that the European accord, instead, implied ‘a comparable 
engagement on the part of the United States’ (Agence France Presse, 
7.11.1990).  
While farm organisations resorted to anti-American discourse in 
order to delegitimise the option of accepting the Commission proposal, 
they did not influence the preference France eventually defended. France 
was still resisting the Commission proposal, but economic considerations 
seemed to be more important than anti-American considerations for the 
government. The importance of community preference – which ensured 
privileged access of member states to the EC market compared to third 
states – was repeatedly emphasized by government officials (Communiqué 
de Premier Ministre, 9 Oct. 1990; Secretériat du Gouvernement, 10 Oct. 
1990). Governmental documents show that France was particularly 
occupied with preserving unity with Germany against the Commission 
proposal (Relevé de décisions de la réunion de ministres tenue le 19 
octobre sous la présidence du Premier Ministre, 24 Oct. 1990). Once 
Germany had gained sufficient concessions from the Commission and was 
inclined to approve the proposal, France decided to make the best of it by 
seeking a few additional concessions to its economic interest and then 
accepting what was left of the original proposal. While anti-American 
discourse influenced the domestic decision-making process (farm lobby 
allegations and governmental reactions), it did not affect the position the 
French government defended in the EC. 
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1991-1992: Anti-americanism in the domestic debate 
The Heysel conference in December 1990, which was intended to 
conclude the Uruguay Round negotiations, ended in a stalemate. The EC 
was blamed due to its unwillingness to make additional concessions to the 
30 per cent support reductions in agriculture. The negotiations were in the 
doldrums until Arthur Dunkel, Secretary General of the GATT, tabled a 
compromise proposal in December 1991. This document proposed 
liberalising the agricultural market and increasing access of third states to 
the EC market, so it was not economically attractive to France (Paemen and 
Bensch 1995). Furthermore, while the Draft Final Act included substantial 
reductions in the EC’s export restitutions, it left the US system of 
deficiency payments untouched. It was in the French economic interest to 
reject the Act.  
The government flatly rejected the Act, but its reaction was markedly 
wrought with arguments similar to those the farmers had applied in 1990. 
According to the Financial Times (6.1.1992), Mitterrand had commented 
during a cabinet meeting that “France is not ready to bow to American 
demands or to submit itself to the interest of any other country, and it will 
not give in”. Mermaz noted that accepting the Dunkel Draft would imply 
that the EC made concessions, whereas the US was unwilling to do the 
same (Le Monde. 20.12.1991).  
If one were to take the statements of the government officials at face 
value, it would seem that anti-American considerations affected the French 
position against Dunkel’s text. It should be kept in mind though, that the 
government may also have applied this discourse to satisfy domestic actors. 
Although farm organizations hardly mobilized against Dunkel’s text, they 
were angry about negotiations on CAP reform that hat commenced in 1991. 
The FNSEA equated CAP reform with giving in to US demands and 
pretensions to dominate the world trade agenda (L’Information Agricole, 
December 1991). Applying anti-American rhetoric with respect to the Draft 
Final Act was at least a means for the government to appease the 
belligerent farm lobby. While it is again difficult to establish whether anti-
Americanism was also a decisive independent cause of the French position, 
the French concerns about greater relative gains for the US (greater relative 
gains for other negotiating partners did not enter the government’s 
considerations) seem to indicate that anti-Americanism informed the 
French perception of its economic interests and led France to oppose 
Dunkel’s proposal. 
When the Draft Final Act was not accepted, agricultural negotiations 
continued on a bilateral level between the EC and the US, and resulted in 
the Blair House accord of November 1992. This included smaller support 
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reductions than the Draft Final Act. Moreover, the larger part, if not the 
whole, of the reductions would already be covered by the CAP reform the 
EC member states had agreed on in May 1992. The Blair House accord was 
unlikely to involve additional economic costs, while it could even be 
beneficial for the French economy if it enabled the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in its entirety, which had been blocked due to agriculture. 
Most French economic interest groups therefore did not reject the accord. 
The farm lobby cautioned the government, in February 1992, that if 
the Commission accepted a compromise before the October elections in the 
US, it would be conniving with the ‘aggressor’ (Le Monde, 29.2.1992). 
Shortly before the Blair House agreement was reached, the farm lobby 
claimed that if the EC accepted a deal with the US, this would be its 
greatest diplomatic humiliation since its establishment (Le Monde, 
20.11.1992). Once the US and the EC reached an agreement on 20 
November 1992, farm organisations called for “absolute resistance against 
the American aggressors” and demanded a “’no’ to an agricultural Munich” 
(L’Information Agricole, November 1992; December 1992). 
The French government rejected the accord, arguing that it had a 
more adverse impact on EC agricultural exports than on American exports 
(Commissariat Général du Plan, 30 Nov. 1990). The government 
considered the agreement to be economically costly, and the effects on EC 
exports were again compared to the effects on US exports in particular, 
even though there were other important competitors. Furthermore, Prime 
Minister Pierre Bérégovoy argued that no state should be allowed to 
impose its will on the rest of the world. Laurent Fabius framed the GATT 
issue as a question of US dominance versus EC independence : “In essence 
it is a question of whether the United States is in charge of the French and 
European economy or if Europe should assert itself“ (Fabius à RTL, 27 
Nov. 1992). France demanded renegotiation of the accord in order to strike 
a better deal. In these negotiations, Europe should be on an equal footing 
with the US and should not allow the US to dictate European policy 
(Interview accordée par Bérégovoy à France 2, 22 Nov. 1992; Interview 
accordée par Fabius à RTL, 27 Nov. 1992). 
Both the farm lobby and the government used anti-American 
discourse, linked to the idea of a strong France leading Europe as a 
counterweight against the US, to delegitimize the option of accepting the 
Blair House accord. While a similar farm lobby discourse had not 
influenced the government in 1990, its influence increased in 1992 because 
the government had grown more sensitive to domestic pressure after the 
near-debacle of the September referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, and 
because parliamentary elections were to be held in March 1993. Anti-
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Americanism therefore affected both French decision-making and its 
position in 1992, at least through the effective use of anti-American 
discourse by the farm lobby. Furthermore, anti-Americanism seemed to 
affect the French perception of its economic interest, assessing the Blair 
House agreement as costly because of potential relative gains for the US, 
while a wider view of its economic interests should have led France to 
accept the deal. 
The March 1993 elections brought the Right back into power under 
the leadership of Édouard Balladur, in cohabitation with socialist President 
Mitterrand. Balladur, like his predecessor, demanded, and eventually 
achieved, the reopening of negotiations with the US in order to strike a 
better deal (Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie 1998:145). The renegotiation 
resulted in a Final Agreement in December 1993. The reduction 
percentages agreed were similar to those of the Blair House Accord (20 per 
cent reduction of internal support, 36 per cent reduction in customs duties, 
and 21 per cent reduction in the volume of subsidized export), but with 
respect to import access the US now accepted the EEC calculation method 
and a reference period for the export assistance reductions that favored the 
EEC.  
 Despite reservations by the farm lobby, France, both considering its 
international political and economic interests, really had no other choice 
but to accept the agreement (Réponse du premier ministre M. Édouard 
Balladur à une question d’actualité à l’Assemblée Nationale, 8 Dec. 1993; 
Declaration de politique générale de M. Édouard Balladur devant 
l’Assemblée Nationale, 15 Dec. 1993). ) for the US and the GATT 
Secretary General had issued credible threats that December 15 would be 
the final deadline for the Uruguay Round. If this deadline was not met, the 
round would fail and gains in domains other than agriculture would be lost. 
The government nevertheless domestically tried to legitimize its acceptance 
of the final deal by presenting it as a victory over the US, emphasizing that 
the US had made concessions even though a few months ago it had claimed 
that it would not alter a syllable in the Blair House Accord (Conférence de 
presse conjointe du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Alain Juppé et du 
ministre de l’agriculture, M. Jean Puech, 7 Dec. 1993). This way, though 
the anti-American looby did not get all that they wanted, they could pretend 
to have done so, showing that anti-American rethoric was useful for French 
domestic consumption. 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our case studies indicate that a distinction is warranted between 
effects on the decision-making process and effects on policies. 
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Conceptualising anti-Americanism as an ideational variable (Higgot and 
Malbasic 2008) – actors have a certain idea of what the US is (e.g. 
unilateralist, capitalist, dominating) and evaluate these traits negatively – 
implies that policies that seem to be inspired by or contribute to American 
unilateralism or world dominance are less attractive. In this sense, ideas 
may affect actors’ evaluation of different policy options in much the same 
way as considerations of political support or economic gains. 
Anti-American discourse can be useful in the domestic policy-
making process to legitimate one’s own position and to delegitimize the 
position of others in order to enhance one’s influence in the debate. This 
reflects what Meunier (2005) has labeled the “policy legitimation” role of 
anti-Americanism and resembles Schimmelfennig’s notion of rhetorical 
action defined as “the strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of 
one’s self interest” (Schimmelfennig 2001:63). In this vein, governmental 
actors may apply anti-US rhetoric to obtain societal support for their 
position and create domestic unity. Societal actors can also engage in 
rhetorical action, employing anti-US discourse to strengthen their influence 
over outcomes and constrain the government in the domestic debate. In 
order to legitimise a policy, one could present it as enabling the state to 
devise its own policies in opposition to the US or as enhancing the state’s 
claim for regional power while curbing US regional influence. 
Alternatively, policies may be delegitimised by depicting them as 
disproportionally beneficial to the US and enhancing US influence in the 
region, to the detriment of one’s own power position.  
Anti-Americanism had a greater effect on the domestic debate in 
France than in Brazil because these sentiments are more widely shared in 
France, as shown by governments of different ideological persuasion 
(Mitterand´s and Balladur’s) using anti-American arguments. One caveat is 
in place though: since the agricultural focus of the French case resulted in 
an emphasis on the agricultural lobby (the industrial lobby usually 
refraining from mobilization in this domain), while the Brazilian case was 
broader in scope, including the military and industrial groups, it could be 
that agricultural groups share deeper anti-American sentiments than 
industrial or military groups, but this falls outside the scope of this article 
and is an interesting avenue for further research. For states such as Brazil, 
where anti-Americanism is present but limited to specific political and 
social actors, the expectation is that anti-Americanism is more likely to 
affect the domestic debate and the power of different actors to the extent 
that the political party or parties in office share anti-American sentiments. 
Empirical proof of this effect can be found when anti-American discourse 
is consistently applied over time, and actors in the domestic process feel 
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obliged to react to allegations that the policies they propose are bad 
because they are typically ‘American’ solutions or contribute to increasing 
US power in the region at the expense of their country.  
This article has shown that anti-Americanism influenced the 
domestic policy process and governmental position in Brazil and France to 
different degrees and in distinct ways. The degree to which anti-American 
sentiments are shared among the population and the political establishment 
as well as the degree to which anti-American aspects are embedded in or 
directly related to a state’s identity seem to be promising variables for 
explaining the effects of anti-Americanism on decision-making and 
policies. Further research could put these expectations to the test. In the 
end, it is not a question of showing that anti-American ideas trump material 
interest or vice versa, but rather of establishing the importance of ideational 
variables in decision-making processes and policies. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that non material variables such as international norms 
are more likely to be influential on softer issues involving, for example, bodily harm or 
legal equality of opportunity.  
2 One may wonder how continuity in French anti-Americanism coincides with 
variations in its position toward NATO. For France, it has always been decisive whether 
NATO could serve French interests and ambitions. Its exit from the organisation’s 
military branch in 1966 can be explained by the French perception that NATO 
particularly furthered US interests and extended the American influence in Europe. The 
end of the cold war and insecurity about future US involvement in the region opened 
opportunities for France to serve its regional interests through NATO in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, considering the adaptations in the organization’s goals and tasks, it was 
also perceived as an instrument to serve French interests in the Mediterranean. This 
explains France’s rapprochement to NATO in the 1990s, which came to an end when 
France did not succeed in gaining command of the NATO fleet in the Mediterranean, 
due to the US unwillingness to give up that role. France returned to the integrated 
command structure of NATO in 2009 under President Sarkozy, who did not seem to 
share the anti-American sentiments of his predecessors, and under strict French 
conditions which, for example, safeguarded its nuclear power. 
3 For the concept of securitisation see Oelsner, 2005.  
4 While the EC used export subsidies (or ‘restitutions’ in their own terms) to stimulate 
the export of agricultural products, the US applied a system of deficiency payments 
which were paid to farmers directly. Both systems of support affected agricultural trade. 
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